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III. Labor Law
A. Misrepresentations in Labor Representation Elections-
Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402
F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968).
Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB' for the first time presented to
the Ninth Circuit the question of the validity of a labor representation
election marred by misrepresentations in campaign literature. The case
developed from a 1964 representation election in which the Retail
Clerks Union, AFL-CIO, sought to become the collective bargaining
representative of K-Mart and its licensees, which included Gallenkamp.
The election was won by the union, 38 to 37, but was challenged by
K-Mart in proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.
The dispute stemmed from a leaflet distributed one or two days prior
to the election which compared current wages paid to petitioner's em-
ployees with higher wages paid to employees performing similar work
in stores under union contract. The union, however, failed to disclose
in its leaflet that the higher rates represented the highest of four wage
rates possible under the union contract and that such wages could be
received only after one year's employment. These omissions were im-
portant because many of the petitioner's employees had been employed
for less than one year. K-Mart, which was unable to refute these last
minute statements, maintained these misrepresentations were so sub-
stantial that they should vitiate the election.
The Board rejected K-Mart's objections and certified the union as
K-Mart's collective bargaining representative. K-Mart thereafter re-
fused to bargain with the union, which responded by instigating a sec-
ond proceeding before the Board2 asking that a cease and desist order
be issued against K-Mart to eliminate conduct that the union contended
constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board complied with the
union's request by ordering K-Mart to cease and desist from its re-
fusal to bargain. K-Mart then petitioned the Ninth Circuit to set aside
the Board's order and by this indirect and circuitous method brought
in issue the validity of the representation election.
The Evolution of Current Board Standards
In the course of litigation, the NLRB has gradually developed
1. Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968). This case
is a consolidation of three cases: Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, K-Mart v. NLRB,
and Hollywood Hat Co. v. NLRB.
2. This second proceeding is reported in 162 N.L.R.B. 498 (1966).
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several principles to determine whether misrepresentations must nullify
a representation election. The Board has attempted to implement the
basic goals of the National Labor Relations Act: to encourage collec-
tive bargaining, and to guarantee employees the right to organize and
select representatives of their own choosing.3 This second goal guided
the Board in the early development of its policy in regulating represen-
tation elections. In the landmark case of General Shoe Corp.,4 in
which the Board crystallized the policy guidelines that have continued
to be espoused (if not actually implemented) down to the present day,
the Board said: "Our only consideration derives from the Act which
calls for freedom of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining
representative." 5 In General Shoe, the Board established the rule that
representation elections were to be conducted as experiments under
laboratory conditions." The Board assumed responsibility for estab-
lishing such conditions and for determining whether they had been
met. If they were not met, the experiment was to be conducted again. 7
Eventually, the ideal of an election conducted under laboratory
conditions became "an objective that no seasoned observer consider[ed]
realistic."" Under the pressure of a mounting workload,' the Board
developed as a goal the speedy resolution of election results. 10 Conse-
quently, by 1958 the Board had softened the requirement of pure labo-
ratory conditions and had taken the position that it was not meant to
police election proceedings. It resolved to leave the distinguishing of
campaign puffing from fact to the good sense of the employees. 1'
The current policy on misrepresentations affecting the validity of
representation elections, promulgated in the leading case of Hollywood
Ceramics Co.,'2 reflects the Board's recognition of the sophistication of
the employee. In that case, the Board held that "laboratory conditions"
were not necessarily impaired when a party "overstates its own virtues
and the vices of the other" party. 3 In noting that complete honesty,
either by the union or the company, was not anticipated by employees,
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
4. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
5. Id. at 126, quoting P. D. Gwaltney, 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 373 (1947).
6. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
7. Id.
8. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 38, 45 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Bok].
9. Bok, supra note 8, at 59-65; Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and
Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 253 & n.d (1968) [hereinafter cited as Samoff].
10. See Bok, supra note 8, at 63. See also 402 F.2d at 536 (dissenting opinion).
11. Celanese Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 303, 306 (1958).
12. 140 N.LR.B. 221 (1962).
13. Id. at 224.
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the Board cautioned against nullifying elections conducted under its
own supervision and observed that setting aside elections would "upset
the plant routine and prevent stable labor-management relations."14
While adhering to its policy that an election must afford employees an
"untrammeled choice," the Board balanced this right with "the right
of the parties to wage a free and vigorous campaign with all the normal
legitimate tools of electioneering."' 5  The Board then restated the cri-
teria to be used in determining misrepresentation cases:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign
trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at
a time which prevents the other party or parties from making an
effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or
not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on
the election. However, the mere fact that a message is inartistically
or vaguely worded and subject to different interpretations will not
suffice to establish such misrepresentations as would lead us to
set the election aside. Such ambiguities, like extravagant promises,
derogatory statements about the other party, and minor dis-
tortions of some facts, frequently occur in communication between
persons.16
These guidelines were qualified, however, by a caveat that is important
to an evaluation of the Gallenkamp decision:
But even where a misrepresentation is shown to have been sub-
stantial, the Board may still refuse to set aside the election if it
finds upon consideration of all the circumstances that the statement
would not be likely to have had a real impact on the election.
For example. . . the Board may find that the employees possessed
independent knowledge with which to evaluate the statements.17
Scope of Judicial Review of Board Decisions
Unlike the wide discretion granted to the NLRB, the judicial role
in controlling representation elections was meant to be limited. Con-
gress established procedures for review of Board decisions by courts of
appeals only on issues of unfair labor practices. 8 Therefore, unless
election behavior constitutes an unfair labor practice as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act,'9 the Board's findings determining the
validity of an election can not be directly appealed to the courts. 20
To secure judicial review of an adverse Board ruling in a representation
14. Id. at 223.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1964).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
20. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 357 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
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proceeding, a party must first commit an unfair labor practice by
defying the Board's decision.2 This difficult, circuitous path to the
courts reflects the congressional intent to place the control of repre-
sentation elections in the hands of the Board.22
Within this unfair labor practices framework, the courts of appeals
in reviewing Board decisions have been additionally limited by the
substantial evidence rule to determining whether the Board's findings
"with respect to questions of fact [were] supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole .... ,"23 The prevailing
interpretation of the substantial evidence test is contained in the Su-
preme Court decision, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB:24
To be sure, the requirement for canvassing "the whole
record" in order to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a
calculus of value by which a reviewing court can assess the evi-
dence. Nor was it intended to negative the function of the Labor
Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed
by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose
findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which
courts do not possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it
mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may
displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different
choice, had the matter been before it de novo. Congress has
merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from set-
ting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that
the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in
the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body
of evidence opposed to the Board's view.25
The Supreme Court has further recognized that courts, in review-
ing Board decisions, should take cognizance of factors which are in-
strumental in the formulation of Board policy. After stating that the
Board has broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, the Court stated:
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). The unfair labor practice complained of in
Gallenkamp was refusal of the company to bargain with the certified union. The un-
fair labor practice proceeding before the Board is found in K-Mart, 162 N.L.R.B. 498
(1966).
22. See JAFFEr 357; Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB Representa-
tion Proceedings, 42 INn. L.. 455, 460-65 (1967).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1964). In Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 147 (1937), the Supreme Court developed the substantial evi-
dence rule in an interpretation of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Congress
retained this limiting rule in the Taft-Hartley Act, but modified it by adding the require-
ment that the record be considered as a whole in order to stop the practice by some
courts of examining only the evidence favorable to the Board. The purpose and his-
tory of this modification is examined in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951).
24. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
25. Id. at 488.
March 19701 LABOR LAW 1023
Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable
area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of
sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more
spacious domain of policy.26
Despite these apparently clear guidelines, the courts of appeals
have approached review of Board election misconduct decisions with
differing attitudes about the nature and scope of that review. Some
courts have probed deeply into Board rulings while others have at-
tempted to ascertain only whether the Board's decision is reasonable in
light of the record. The First Circuit, for example, in a decision ex-
tremely critical of Board policy, chastized the Board for the bases it used
to develop policy. 7 At the other extreme, a Seventh Circuit decision
avoided extensive investigation of Board findings out of respect for
what the court felt was the Board's wide discretion. 28  Earlier Ninth
Circuit decisions appear to side with the latter view that "[t]he control
of elections resides in the Board alone. ' 29  Although the issue of cam-
paign misconduct has reached the Ninth Circuit before,30 Gallenkamp
represents the first time in which the misconduct complained of con-
cerned misrepresentations in an election campaign.3 1
To understand the implications of the Gallenkamp decision, it is
necessary to examine it in relation to the guidelines developed by the
Board in Hollywood Ceramics,3 2 the Ninth Circuit's respect for the fac-
tors responsible for Board policy, and the nature and scope of the
court's review.
The Ninth Circuit and Hollywood Ceramics
In Gallenkamp, the NLRB followed the hands-off policy of Hol-
lywood Ceramics. Conceding that there were misrepresentations 33 (al-
though it made no finding as to their substantiality), the Board appar-
ently relied on the caveat in Hollywood Ceramics that "even where a
misrepresentation is shown to have been substantial,"34 the election may
26. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363 (1951), quoting Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); see Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 681 n.1 (1944), where the Supreme Court said the judgment of
the Board is entitled to great weight on questions of law. In Gotten Marine Co.
v. Douds, 137 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. (1956)), the court stated that an inter-
pretation of the National Labor Relations Act by the Board is entitled to great weight.
27. NLRB v. Trancoa Chem. Corp., 303 F.2d 456 (lst Cir. 1962).
28. Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1958).
29. Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 409 (9th Cir. 1954);
accord, International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1961).
30. E.g., Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954).
31. 402 F.2d at 534.
32. See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
33. 402 F.2d at 533.
34. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
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still be valid if the Board determines that there are circumstances which
mitigate the adverse impact of the misrepresentations. 5  The example
of such circumstances hypothesized by the Board in Hollywood Cer-
amics paralleled the facts later found by the Board in Gallenkamp:
"that the employees possessed independent knowledge with which to
evaluate the statements."3 6 The Board found that the employees could
evaluate the misrepresentations contained in the union leaflet by com-
paring the misstatements with a truthful handbill, mailed to the em-
ployees 10 days earlier, which presented more complete data on the
subject matter of the disputed leaflet.3 7 The Board also found that the
employees could have ascertained the truth about wages paid under
union contract by inquiring of employees at unionized stores.38
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board's order avoided a
determination of whether or not the Board's finding that the employees
had adequate sources of information was supported by substantial evi-
dence. Instead, it based its decision on an independent determination
of the materiality of the misrepresentation, the timing of the misrep-
resentation, 39 and the closeness of the election vote. The court em-
phasized that a misrepresentation concerning wages, which it classified
as the "stuff of life for Unions and members," 40 was of paramount
importance. Furthermore, the distribution of the disputed leaflet on
the eve of the election afforded the company no effective opportunity
to reply to the misrepresentations contained in the circular.41 Finally,
the court apparently felt that the likelihood of these circumstances ef-
fecting the outcome of the election was increased by the union's thin
one-vote margin of victory.4 s
Under the guidelines of Hollywood Ceramics, it is evident the
Ninth Circuit's finding of a material misrepresentation could not justify
a contrary conclusion to the decision of the Board unless the court also
determined that there was not substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding of an adequate opportunity on the part of the em-
ployees to investigate and compare the misrepresentations. Although
35. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
36. 140 N.LR.B. at 224.
37. 402 F.2d at 533; Brief for Respondent at 54-56, Gallenkamp Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. 402 F.2d at 534; Brief for Respondent at 54-56, Gallenkamp Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968).
39. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
40. 402 F.2d at 534.
41. Id. at 535.
42. See 402 F.2d at 535. The court's emphasis on the closeness of the election
vote does not conflict with Board policy. See, e.g., Higgins, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 845,
846-47 (1953). See Samoff, supra note 9, at 237 n.26, who states that, although the
Board seldom declares the margin of victory to be a factor, the margin of victory is
influential as a "latent element."
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the Ninth Circuit noted that the Board had relied primarily on this
finding to justify its certification of the election,43 the court never ex-
pressly considered its adequacy. The finding either was ignored en-
tirely, or was considered, sub silentio, to be insufficiently supported. If
the court did in fact decide the issue, but merely failed to mention it-
a highly unlikely prospect-its decision, although misleading, would
nevertheless be correct. On the other hand, if the court refused to con-
sider the mitigating factors found by the Board as bearing on the deci-
sion, it would appear to be finding as a matter of law, that once an
election is found to have been tainted by substantial misrepresentations,
no independent source of information available to the voters will save
that election. If this is the case, then the Ninth Circuit, ignoring the
Supreme Court's admonition against "sliding unconsciously . . . into
the . . . spacious domain of [Board] policy,' 4 4 is basing its decision on
an improper application of law in disregarding the standards promul-
gated in Hollywood Ceramics. In any event, the court must be criti-
cized for remaining silent on the issue, for when the courts of appeals
deny enforcement of Board decisions, the substantial evidence rule de-
mands that they refute all issues presented by the Board that could
justify the Board's decision.4 5
The court's failure to adhere to the policies of the Board is re-
flected throughout the Gallenkamp opinion. For example, instead of
looking to the Hollywood Ceramics guidelines and seeking to under-
stand the Board policy expressed therein, the court looked, to compa-
rable cases in other circuits for guidance.4 6 Furthermore, although the
court did not refer to "laboratory conditions" in so many words, it
appears to have been influenced by the policy basis of that theory4 7 in
rejecting the permissive, hands-off view of Hollywood Ceramics in favor
43. 402 F.2d at 533; Brief for Respondent at 54-56, Gallenkamp Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968).
44. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363 (1951), quoting Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); see text accompanying note 26 supra.
45. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see text
accompanying note 25 supra.
46. 402 F.2d at 534-35. The court especially relied on the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Celanese Corp. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1961), instead of using
the guidelines outlined in Hollywood Ceramics. In Celanese, the Seventh Circuit held
that in order to set aside an election it must be shown that "(1) there has been a material
misrepresentation of fact, (2) this misrepresentation comes from a party who had
special knowledge or was in an authoritative position to know the true facts, and (3)
no other party had sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresentations before the
election." Celanese Corp. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir. 1961), quoted in
Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1968).
47. See 402 F.2d at 533-35, where the court emphasized the goal of protecting
the free choice of the employees. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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of the stricter General Shoe4 position originally espoused by the
Board. The Board's present policy of shunning the role of policeman
was mentioned but once, quickly followed by "however," and never
mentioned again. 49 Its policy of seeking the speedy resolution of elec-
tion results, although mentioned in the dissent,50 was never explored
by the majority of the court. All-in-all, the Gallenkamp decision
evidences almost total disregard for the present policies that the NLRB
has developed to guide its overseeing of representation elections.
Court Scrutiny of Board Decisions
Derek Bok, in a leading article on the regulation of representation
elections,51 observed that "recently . . . courts of appeals have called
upon the Board to scrutinize campaign propaganda with greater
care."5 2 Viewed in isolation, Gallenkamp might appear to substantiate
Bok's assertion as far as the Ninth Circuit is concerned. Evidence
supporting a finding that the Ninth Circuit has joined this trend can
be found in its reliance on Celanese Corp. of America v. NLRB,53
a leading case demanding closer Board scrutiny of campaign propa-
ganda.54
The Ninth Circuit's apparent alignment with the courts described by
Bok, however, is quite probably illusory; Gallenkamp stands virtually
alone against a substantial array of decisions and a majority of the
Ninth Circuit judges. Indeed, Judge Ely's critical dissent in Gallen-
kamp appears to be more in line with past Ninth Circuit decisions. Ely
criticized the majority for substituting its judgment for that of the
Board and stated that the court should respect the expert determination
of the Board, which "has a paramount interest in the preservation of
the integrity of elections conducted under its own processes." 55
Prior Ninth Circuit support for Ely's position is exemplified by
Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 50 which upheld an NLRB decision
voiding a representation election and represents the antithesis of the
position taken by the Gallenkamp court. While Gallenkamp made
48. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); see text accompanying notes
6-8 supra.
49. 402 F.2d at 533.
50. id. at 536.
51. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 45 (1964).
52. Bok, supra note 51, at 83.
53. 279 F.2d 204 (7th Cir- 1960), vacated per curiam and remanded, 365 U.S.
297 (1961), enforcement denied, 291 F.2d 224 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925
(1961).
54. Bok, supra note 51, at 83.
55. 402 F.2d at 536.
56. 215 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954).
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passing reference to the substantial evidence rule,57 Foreman & Clark
stated that the Board must be "clearly" erroneous before the court can
intercede; 58 and although Gallenkamp mentioned in passing the "discre-
tion" of the Board, 59 Foreman & Clark glorified the expertise of ad-
ministrative agencies and stressed the "limited functions of review by
the judiciary." 60
The position presented in Foreman & Clark was reaffirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB.6 '
This case enforced a Board decision to certify an election in which two
employees, whose votes might have affected the outcome of the elec-
tion, were inadvertently not afforded an opportunity to vote. The
court noted that "[r]epeated appellate court litigation without allowing
considerable discretion on the part of the NLRB thwarts" the policy of
Congress to have the Board expedite the process of choosing repre-
sentatives. 62 The court properly implemented the substantial evidence
test, as interpreted by Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,63 when it
stated:
Hence, although we may think that the NLRB might have
been better advised to order a new election, we do not believe
there was an abuse of discretion in failing so to do ...
a . Surely it would be vain for this court to hold that we
are better equipt [sic] than the NLRB to determine whether the
opportunity given employees to vote was "adequate" unless clear
error was shown.64
The cautious approach reflected in the International Telephone &
Telegraph and Foreman & Clark cases can also be seen in the more re-
cent cases of NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet,5 decided less than four
months before Gallenkamp, and Sonoco Products Co. v. NLRB,66 de-
cided just one day before Gallenkamp. Both cases, decided without
dissent, upheld Board holdings on representation elections." In E-Z
Davies, Judge Ely summarily disposed of arguments attacking the
57. The court in Gallenkamp mentioned the substantial evidence test only once
toward the end of the opinion in a statement which seems to represent more of an
afterthought than a presentation of an important factor. See id. at 535.
58. Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 398 (9th Cir. 1954).
59. 402 F.2d at 533.
60. Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 1954).
61. 294 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1961).
62. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1961).
63. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
64. 294 F.2d at 395; accord, NLRB v. J.R. Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170 (9th
Cir. 1963).
65. 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968).
66. 399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968).
67. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968), denied enforce-
ment of the NLRB order on other grounds.
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Board's finding of a valid election, and in Sonoco, the court noted the
"broad discretion" of the Board in solving representation election dis-
putes.68 The disposition of the seven different circuit judges69 appearing
in the E-Z Davies, Sonoco, and Gallenkamp cases casts doubt on a con-
clusion that the two to one majority in Gallenkamp unalterably commits
the Ninth Circuit to a policy of close scrutiny of election propaganda.
When comparing the opinions of the Ninth Circuit judges, the majority
in Gallenkamp becomes a minority in the circuit. When contrasting
the decisions of the Ninth Circuit, Gallenkamp stands alone.
The intent of Congress to make the Board, not the courts, the over-
seer of representation elections demands a different result from that
delivered in Gallenkamp. This intention, manifested in the circuitous
path to court review, 70 has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit in
prior decisions.71 The substantial evidence rule, established to insure
that decisions of the Board be given respect, 72 was misused by the
court when it reversed the holding of the Board without determining the
validity of the findings which supported the Board's decision. The court
not only ignored the factual basis of the Board's determination, it also
failed to consider the Board's policy as outlined in Hollywood Ceramics,
relying instead on selected decisions from other circuits.
In future representation election misconduct cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit should look to Judge Ely's dissent and recognize Gallenkamp as
an anomaly which deserves little, if any, weight as proper authority.
A reevaluation of Gallenkamp in light of the'intent of Congress and the
rationale behind Board policy should guide the Ninth Circuit to de-
cisions that will respect the Board's "wide degree of discretion in estab-
lishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and
free choice of bargaining representatives." '73
James T. Winkler*
68. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1968).
69. In addition to two circuit judges, District Judge Crocker also participated
in the Sonoco decision. Judge Ely was the only judge to sit in more than one of the
three cases, Gallenkamp and E-Z Davies. The other circuit judges appearing in the
three cases were Pope, Duniway, Barnes, Jertberg, Hamley, and Carter. The last
two represented the majority in Gallenkamp.
70. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
71. See International Tel. & Tel. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1961),
where the Ninth Circuit recognized the intention of Congress to place the chore of
regulating representation elections in the NLRB. See Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392
F.2d 354, 356 (2d Cir. 1968), where the Second Circuit noted the intention of Con-
gress to make it difficult to obtain review by the courts.
72. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
73. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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B. NLRB Order Moot on Appeal-NLRB v. Raytheon Co.,
408 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
The constitutional "case or controversy" requirement in federal
litigation has imposed certain restrictions on the ability of litigants to
have their claims decided by the federal judiciary.' It has often been
said that some tangible controversy must exist before a decision deter-
mining the rights and duties of the parties can be rendered.2 This con-
troversy must presently exist and be between real parties; federal courts
will not hear cases where the issues have become moot.' This Note
1. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. An actual case or controversy is required. Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Such case or controversy must be ripe. United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The federal courts will refuse to
hear collusive suits. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943). Furthermore,
the party must have standing to sue. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. (1943). This
"standing" requirement has recently been stated to mean that the party bringing the
suit must have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). For a recent liberalization of the standing
requirement, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Although well beyond the scope
of this note, certain exceptions to strict adversarial procedures have arisen, especially
in the state courts. E.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769 (1952).
2. E.g., Nashville, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co.
v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892). See also Frankfurter,
A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HAiv. L. REv. 1002, 1003 (1924). "The stuff of
these contests are facts, and judgment upon facts. Every tendency to deal with them
abstractly, to formulate them in terms of sterile legal questions, is bound to result in
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."
3. E.g., St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514 (1911); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). See also
Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
772 (1955). "Under the Federal Constitution, the courts of the United States can
render decisions only in 'cases' and 'controversies.' However, these terms inherently
are capable of many varying interpretations and have never been defined authoritatively.
Hence, any restriction of judicial power created by construction of such terms may
properly be termed self-imposed. In determining what acts fall outside the scope of the
judicial function, courts have established the rule that they have no power to decide
moot cases.
"The most important and basic reason for judicial denial of the power to decide
moot cases is one which lies at the very heart of common-law jurisprudence. Our
basic legal philosophy is premised on the theory that the best way to achieve a wise
resolution of disputed legal matters is to allow each party his day in court to present
his views, with opportunity to challenge and rebut those of his opponent. This adver-
sary system depends upon self-interest as the motive best suited to bring all pertinent
facts, policies and legal issues before the court. When one party to an action has
nothing to gain from a decision in his favor, many of the advantages of the adversary
system are likely to be lost, since a disinterested person probably will not exert the
same effort to bring all considerations before the court as one about to be affected ad-
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will analyze the Ninth Circuit's per curiam decision in NLRB v. Ray-
theon Co., I which held that events occurring subsequent to the National
Labor Relations Board's cease and desist order have rendered moot, on
appeal and petition for enforcement, the issue of the initial propriety of
the Board's order.
The NLRB Proceedings
On January 4, 1965, the International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE) filed a petition seeking to be
established as the labor representative5 of Raytheon's Mountain View,
California, plant.6 The election, conducted by the Board on February
4, 1965, resulted in 161 votes for the IUE, 54 for the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and 301 votes for no union. One
week later the IUE filed a petition7 to set aside the election,8 and on
April 6, 1965, unfair labor practice charges were filed.' The issues
of unfair practices and objections to the election were consolidated
before the Board. Thereafter, the Board found unfair labor practice
violations1 ° and consequently ordered Raytheon to cease and desist
from questioning employees about union activities, threatening losses of
existing benefits if union representation were chosen, threatening an
anticipatory refusal to bargain in good faith, and coercing and inter-
versely by an unfavorable decision." Id. at 772-73. Like many former procedural
barriers, a restrictive determination of mootness is being relaxed in the federal courts.
See Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 382 U.S. 40
(1968).
4. 408 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
5. See the NLRB rules in 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-.72 (1969) for representation
procedures governing section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c) (1964).
6. Raytheon Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1603, 1606 (1966).
7. The petition was filed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1969).
8. The grounds relied on by the union to set aside the election were twofold:
(1) Practices of the employer during the election campaign regarding union solicita-
tion, canvassing, and distribution of union literature, and (2) certain coercive speeches
and statements by the employer before the election, also relied on in the union's
subsequent unfair labor practice charge against the employer. See note 9 infra.
9. The IUE's unfair labor practice petition alleged Raytheon had violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1964), by
employer speeches given to employees prior to the election. Raytheon Co., 160
N.L.R.B. 1603, 1606-09 (1966). Section 8(a)(1) states that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964):
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
10. See note 9 supra.
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fering with employees' right to self-organize and form labor unions."'
Interwoven yet distinct from the alleged unfair labor practices was
the other issue in the consolidated proceeding: whether Raytheon's
methods of discouraging union representation during the IUE's pre-
election campaign went beyond the permissible bounds of employer
free speech. The issue was resolved in favor of the union; the Board
found that Raytheon's policies against union campaign solicitation, can-
vassing, and distribution of literature "effectively foreclosed" the IUE
"from presenting its claims and arguments to employees while they were
on company premises. '12  While the Board no longer demands pure
"laboratory conditions"' for election procedures, conduct of the em-
ployer such as the Board found in Raytheon, which substantially inter-
feres with the fair resolution of an election, does merit setting aside that
election.' 4 In addition, it is well-settled policy that any conduct vio-
lative of section 8(a) (1) of the Act" a fortiori interferes with the
election and warrants its nullification by the NLRB. 1 It appears, there-
fore, that the Board rested its decision to set aside the election on two
grounds, either of which seems sufficientY
The Board pursuant to statute' 8 sought enforcement of its cease
and desist order in the Ninth Circuit. With leave of court, Raytheon
11. Raytheon Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1603, 1604-05, 1611 (1966). The Board, for
the most part, affirmed the trial examiner's findings of fact and law. For the minor
Board modifications and additions to the trial examiner's order, see Raytheon Co.,
160 N.L.R.B. 1603, 1604-05 (1966). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34-.45 (1969) for the
functions and duties of the trial examiner and for provisions regarding transfer from
the examiner to the Board.
12. Raytheon Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1603, 1610 (1966). "[Tlhe union can file
objections to the election alleging that because of the conduct of . . . the employer...
the employee has not been able to exercise his 'fullest freedom [of] the rights guaranteed
by this Act.'" Note, National Labor Relations Act Election: Post-Election Objections, 38
TEMP. L.Q. 288, 289 (1965).
13. The requirement that elections be conducted under laboratory conditions was
first enunciated in the landmark case, General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127
(1948). Any conduct which upsets these laboratory conditions was sufficient to set
aside the election. Subsequently, it appeared, however, that such guidelines were
unrealistic, especially in light of the Board's increasing caseload. See Bok, The Regu-
lation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 45 (1964); 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1020 (1970).
14. E.g., Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); Sewell Mfg. Co.,
138 N.LR.B. 66 (1962).
15. 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1) (1964); see note 9 supra.
16. E.g., Industrial Steel Prods. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 336, 347 (1963); Lloyd A.
Roofing Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1327 (1963); see Note, National Labor Relations Act
Elections: Post-Election Objections, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 288, 290 (1965).
17. The Board did feel that the employer's restrictions on the union's preelection
campaign were alone sufficient to merit setting aside the election. Raytheon Co.,
160 N.L.R.B. 1603, 1610 (1966).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
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was permitted to supplement the record and move for dismissal of the
proceedings on the ground the controversy had been mooted because a
second election, certified by the Board, had produced the same results
as the first.1 9 The Ninth Circuit, on the authority of General Engineer-
ing, Inc. v. NLRB,2 ° granted the employer's motion and dismissed the
proceedings.
The facts in General Engineering were substantially the same as
those in Raytheon. A representation election was held but no labor
union gained representation; one union petitioned to set aside the
election; and unfair labor practice charges were later brought. In a
consolidated hearing, the Board issued a cease and desist order and
set aside the election. A second election was held, with the same re-
sults, and this time the Board certified the results. 21  On the em-
ployer's petition for review of the order made pursuant to the first
election and the Board's cross-petition for enforcement, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that certification of the second election results made "moot
all portions of the order which relate to the representation case."'22 The
Court stated that since the second election "was properly held under
circumstances which permitted the employees to freely choose their bar-
gaining representative without restraint, coercion, [or] threatened re-
prisals of interference by petitioners," the issue of the offensive conduct
preceeding the first election was moot.23
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit in Raytheon and General
Engineering failed to analyze properly the nature and purpose of the
Board's cease and desist order. A brief exploration of the factual and
legal nature of the Board's order will demonstrate the court's improper
disposition of these cases.
19. NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 408 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1969).
20. 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962).
21. The Board certified "that a majority of the valid ballots had not been cast
for any labor organization appearing on the ballot, and that no such organization is
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit here involved, within the
meaning of . . .the ...Act." Id. at 572. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(b) (1969) for
certification procedures.
22. 311 F.2d at 572. The portion of the order which so related ordered the
the employer to cease and desist from "interrogating any of their employees with
respect to any employee's activities, membership, or interest in, or connection with,
any labor organization in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the . . . Act; promising ...any of their employees
that they will be given a wage increase or recreational facilities or any other benefit
or advantage if they reject or forgo union representation or abstain from any activity
in, or on behalf of, any labor organization; threatening or otherwise informing any
of their employees that if they select a collective-bargaining representative, the Re-
spondent will refuse or decline to negotiate or bargain .... " General Eng'r,
Inc., 131 N.LR.B. 648, 651-52 (1961).
23. 311 F.2d at 572.
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Consolidation of Proceedings Before the NLRB
Since both the unfair labor practice charges and the objections to
the election proceedings in Raytheon and General Engineering were
consolidated before the Board, the Ninth Circuit panels may have
confused the two issues. Unfair labor practices are not litigable in repre-
sentation proceedings. 24  This is not to say, however, that in such pro-
ceedings, conduct which would amount to an unfair labor practice is
excluded from Board consideration. To the contrary, in determining
the validity of an election, the Board considers all relevant interference
with the election, but without regard to whether the conduct could
also be denominated an unfair labor practice.2 5 Since in Raytheon
and General Engineering, the proceedings were consolidated, the con-
duct amounting to an unfair labor practice was also partially relied
upon to set aside the elections.2 6  Because it misconstrued the order
under review, the Ninth Circuit seems to have confused the overlapping
aspects of representation and unfair labor practice proceedings. 27  It
should be stressed that the court in Raytheon and General Engineering
was called upon to review or enforce the Board's cease and desist
24. E.g., Ford Motor Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 932, 936-37 (1951); Time Square
Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361, 365 (1948).
25. E.g., NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 379 F.2d 172, 182 (6th Cir. 1967);
Clearfield Cheese Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Shirlington
Supermarkets, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 652 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955);
Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
887 (1954).
26. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra.
27. It should be noted that it is the policy of the Board not to conduct repre-
sentative elections during the pendency of unfair labor practice cases unless the union
requests an early election and agrees not to protest on the basis of unremedied unfair
labor practices. NLRB v. Trimfit of Cal., 211 F.2d 206, 209 n.2 (9th Cir. 1954).
Where one of the parties, therefore, engages in preelection conduct which interferes
with the election, the complaining party has two choices: (1) File unfair labor prac-
tice charges which will require postponement of the election until final determination
of the charge, or (2) await the outcome of the election, moving to set it aside if it
loses. In the latter situation the unfair labor practices may continue unchecked,
possibly resulting in the union's defeat in an upcoming election. A refusal to enforce
the cease and desist order because of mootness could have such a resulting effect, thus
encouraging rather than preventing unfair labor practices. The unfair practice, no
matter how blatant, would never be subject to a remedial order, enforceable by a
court, if the second election, as in Raytheon, were certified by the Board. If the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that fairly conducting the second election constituted com-
pliance with the Board's initial order, it is well-settled that compliance, in itself, is no
defence to a suit for enforcement. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S.
217, 225 n.7 (1949); Walling v. Youngman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419
(1945); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 271 (1938);
NLRB v. Hecks, Inc., 369 F.2d 370, 371 (6th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Rippee, 339 F.2d
315 (9th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); NLRB v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 327 F.2d 109
111 (7th Cir. 1963); Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc., v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 888, 891-92
(3d Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Trimfit of Cal., 211 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1954).
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order,28 not set aside the election. 29  The Board requested enforcement
in order to remedy the unfair labor practices. The Board's subsequent
certification of the second election, it is submitted, should have no ef-
fect on the distinct unfair labor practice charge.
Purpose of a Cease and Desist Order
The Ninth Circuit's decision in General Engineering upon which
the dismissal in Raytheon rested, was premised on the following dictum
from the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.:30
When circumstances do arise after the Board's order has been
issued which may affect the propriety of enforcement of the order,
the reviewing court has discretion to decide the matter itself or to
remand it to the Board for further consideration. For example,
where the order obviously has become moot, the court can deny
enforcement without further ado; but where the matter is one in-
volving complicated or disputed facts or questions of statutory
policy, a remand to the Board is ordinarily in order.31
The Court in the Jones & Laughlin Steel case, however, found that the
particular issue before it was not moot, pointing out that "[tihe order
was a continuing command which may be effectuated in the fu-
ture. . . . Hence its validity must be judged as of the time when it
was issued . ... "32 In a later case, NLRB v. Mexis Textile Mills,
Inc.,"3 the Supreme Court dispelled the notions of any who might have
felt that the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel intended to put forth a
generally applicable doctrine of mootness: "A Board order imposes a
continuing obligation; and the Board is entitled to have the resumption
of the unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree. '34
In Raytheon, the Board had found that the employer's conduct
before the first election amounted to an unlawful coercion in violation
of the employee's right to self-organization 35 and ordered it to cease
and desist from questioning employees about union activities, from im-
28. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964): "If
upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person . . . has engaged in or is engaging in any . . . unfair labor practice . . .
the Board . . . shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practices . .. ."
29. The decision whether to set aside a challenged election is in the discretion
of the Board, and the courts will not interfere. See, e.g., NLRB v. AJ. Tower Co.,
329 U.S. 324, 330, 333 (1946); NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89, 93
(3d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarkets, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 652 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
30. 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id. at 422.
33. 339 U.S. 563 (1950).
34. Id. at 567.
35. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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plying that employees would lose existing benefits if union representa-
tion were chosen, and from refusing to bargain in good faith. 6 From
a legal standpoint, the Ninth Circuit's determination that a second fairly
conducted election made such conduct a moot issue seems clearly erro-
neous on three grounds.
First, even though much of the damage caused by an employer's
initial unfair labor practices has already occurred, this is no basis for
denying enforcement on grounds of mootness. Any remedial order
issued by the Board and properly enforced by the court only works
after the fact and "ignores the time lost by the union until the date of
the NLRB decision and the time needed to counteract the original
impediment to organization activity. '3 7  This lost time may very well
dissipate any momentum the union may have generated during the
election campaign.
Second, and closely related to the first, the past unfair labor prac-
tices may deter workers from jumping on the union's bandwagon,
while the threat of similar future employer misconduct may dissuade
possible union sympathizers from supporting a unionization drive. But
if the workers were to know that a court had said that the employer's
conduct was improper, must be terminated, and can not be resumed,
union activity might again step up.38 Indeed, one of the primary pur-
poses of a Board order of this type is to prevent an employer from en-
joying "any advantage which he has gained by violations of the Act ' 3
and to "re-establish the status quo which existed before the employer
committed his unfair labor practices .. ".."-o On these grounds alone,
the Ninth Circuit should have enforced the order in Raytheon.
A third and final factor militating against a finding of mootness
is that without a remedial order, the conduct complained of as an un-
fair practice may be repeated at some time after the second election. 4 1
Clearly, one of the primary purposes of a remedial order is to bar any
future employer violations,42 and the purpose of the National Labor
36. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
37. Note, Remedial Effectuation of the Policies of the NLRA, 44 IND. L.J. 86,
95-96 (1968).
38. See NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1947), where the
court pointed out that a union can reasonably be expected to continue its organizational
drive, perhaps filing a petition for a later election.
39. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
40. Note, Remedial Effectuation of the Policies of the NLRA, 44 IND. L. 86,
91 (1968).
41. "[Ulnless the court is persuaded that the defendant would probably not
resume the alleged violations of law upon removal of that pressure, a justiciable contro-
versy remains and the case will not be dismissed as moot." Diamond, Federal Juris-
diction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U .PA. L. REv. 125, 146 (1946).
42. E.g., NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 567 (1950).
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Relations Act is not facilitated by unneeded litigation when an early
remedial decree enforced by the court would settle the matter once
and for all.
In establishing the NLRB to implement the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, Congress endowed it with the power to hear com-
plaints and grievances and make various policy determinations pur-
suant to the guidelines of the Act. Section 10(c) provides in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall
be of the opinion that any person . . . has engaged in or is en-
gaging in any . . . unfair labor practice . . . the Board . . .
shall issue. an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practices, and to take such affirmative ac-
tion. . . as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter .... 4
In interpreting the Act, the courts have stated that it "charges the Board
with the task of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the
Act"; 44 "[iln fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations of
the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experi-
ence.",
45
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit by overturning the Board's
decision in Raytheon has prevented the Board from performing this
legislative mandate. The Board's action should receive the court's
approval if it is not "a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those
which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act."4  In
Raytheon, the policies of the Act could have been effectuated only by
enforcement of the Board's order. The finding of mootness by the
Ninth Circuit may very well encourage rather than prevent violations
of the Act. As the Supreme Court has stated: "[A]n order of the
character made by the Board, lawful when made, does not become moot
because it is obeyed or because changing circumstances indicate that
the need for it may be less than when made."'47
Don R. Prigo*
43. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) (emphasis added).
44. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953). 'The sole
issue is whether the remedy fashioned by the Board will, under the particular circum-
stances here, effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act." NLRB v.
Metalab-Labcraft, 367 F.2d 471, 472 (4th Cir. 1966). See Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 202, 216 (1964).
45. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
46. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
47. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 271 (1938).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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